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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 930311-CA
Priority No.2

vs.
CALVIN GROTEPAS,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal of Appellant by
virtue of Utah Code §78-2a-3(2) (d) , (f) (1953, as amended,

1992).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The City relies upon the following provisions and statutes:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
1

which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Utah Code §76-6-206(2), et seg (1953, as amended

1992) states:

(2) A person
is guilty of criminal
trespass
if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any
person or damage to any property, including the use
of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
(ii) intends to commit any crime other than theft
or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will
cause fear for the safety of another; or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters
or remains on property as to which notice against
entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for
the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed
to exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to
the attention of intruders;
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2) (a) is a class C misdemeanor
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class
B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or
remained; and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the
owner's use of the property.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

WAS THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT THE RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
A.

Did

Trial

Counsel's

performance

meet

an

objective

standard of reasonableness?
B.

Is there a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the
2

trial would have been different absent Trial Counsel's
errors?
II.

CAN THE DEFENDANT CLAIM PLAIN ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S

FAILURE TO ENTER A JUDGEMENT OF ACQUITTAL BASED ON A DEFENSE THAT
WAS NEVER PRESENTED AT TRIAL?
A.

Should the failure to present the statutory defense to
trespass have been obvious to the Court?

B.

Did the Trial Court's failure to enter an acquittal based
on

the

statutory

defense

to

trespass

affect

the

substantial rights of the accused?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact.

However, where the claim is raised for

the first time on appeal, The Court can only determine that the
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do
so as a matter of law. State v. Snyder, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 36,
P.2d

(Utah App. 1993).
Defendant's claim of plain error is also raised for the first

time on appeal.

Issues raised for the first time on appeal can be

addressed only if the appellate court determines that (1) the error
should have been obvious to a trial court, and (2) the error was
harmful in that it affected the substantial rights of the accused.
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
3

On April 1, 1993, Defendant was arrested after he entered the
Salt Lake Art Center School

in spite of being told by the

management and faculty of the Art Center that he was not welcome to
return.

The defendant was issued a citation for trespassing, an

infraction, in violation of the Salt Lake City Code. He was later
charged by information with the same offense. Trial to the Bench,
the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Commissioner, was held on April
26, 1993.
entered.

A judgement of guilty was reached and conviction was
This appeal followed.

FACTS
In early 1993, the defendant was enrolled at the Salt Lake Art
Center School as a student.

T. at 5.

Defendant was informed on

March 23, 1993 and on March 24, 1993 that he would not be accepted
as a student at the Art Center School in the future.

T. at 5-7.

Defendant was specifically told that he was not welcome at the Art
Center building.

T. at 6.

On April 1st, 1993, Defendant appeared at the entrance to the
Art Center School.

T. at 8.

Defendant was informed that if he

entered he would be arrested for trespassing.
Security where going to bar him from entering.

Defendant asked if
He was told that

they did not want him to enter because then they would have to
arrest him. T. at 8,9. Defendant said "I want to be arrested11 and
entered the school, where he was arrested.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
4

T. at 9.

The failure of trial counsel to raise the statutory defense
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because
the manner of presenting a defense is a matter of trial strategy
and tactics which are in the attorney's discretion.

Additionally,

the facts of the case suggest that the defense is not applicable.
Therefore, the failure to present the defense was harmless and
defendant could not be prejudiced.
The failure of the trial court to enter an acquittal based on
the statutory defense is not plain error for the same reasons noted
above.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO PRESENT THE STATUTORY DEFENSE

WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
To sustain a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, it
must be shown that trial counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that the failure to meet
that standard prejudiced the defendant.
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984),
Adv. Rep. 3,
36,
3,

P.2d
P.2d

P.2d

(Utah 1993),

Strickland v. Washington,

Fernandez v. Cook, 217 Utah
Snyder, 220 Utah Adv. Rep.

(Utah App. 1993), State v. Hay, 221 Utah Adv. Rep.
(Utah 1993) , State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949 (Utah

App. 1993) .

A.

Trial Counsel's representation met an objective standard
of reasonableness.
5

In Fernandez, the defendant's ineffective assistance claim was
based on trial counsel's alleged failure to prepare for a sexual
abuse trial properly.
witnesses

including

Specifically, the failure to interview
one

expert

witness

and

to

obtain

independent opinions about the testimony of one expert.

any
The

defendant also claimed that counsel was ineffective in claiming to
the jury in opening statement that he was prepared to prove
fabrication as a defense and then not introducing evidence of a
long-standing feud between the defendant and the victim.
In reviewing these claims, the Supreme Court of this state
determined

that the errors cited were tactical

or strategic

decisions, and the Court noted "we will not question strategic
decisions unless there is no reasonable basis for the decision."
Fernandez at 5.

The Court also noted that "counsel's manner of

presenting a defense, in this case the fabrication defense, goes to
the heart of trial tactics."

Fernandez at 6.

Similarly, counsel's decisions about what defense to present
in the case now before the court are strategic decisions which
should not be questioned unless there is no reasonable basis.

In

the matter cit hand, there clearly was a reasonable basis for trial
counsel's decision not to present the statutory defense. Utah Code
§76-6-206 (4)1 requires that for the defense to be applicable, the
1

Although the cited defense is found in the Utah Code, the
defendant was tried and convicted in this case under Salt Lake City
Ordinance 11.36.130. The Salt Lake City Ordinance does not contain
the defense asserted in this appeal and contained in the Utah Code.
The City concedes that the statutory defense is applicable to the
City Ordinance as well as the State Code.
It is not known whether trial counsel for the defendant was
6

property must b e open to the public

the actor

entered or

"The Ar t Center i s a prd vate • i ion pr of i t entit- y

reinaJ ned
10

when

1" at

A d d i t i o n a l l y , a l t h o u g h n o e v i d e n c e w a s a d d u c e d o n t h e point: at

t r i a l , it c o u l d v e r y reasonably ^f~ c o n c e d e d
A,rf: Center i s
statute.2

In fact,

-

t_

hat t h e s c h o o l a i t h e

" ' for p u r p o s e s of t h e

i t is a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d

trial,, that p e o p l e a r e a d m i t t e d t-r r!:f- r.*h"";
:

a f e e for t u i t i o n , a n d t:l lat t:I;

-

r

• v-n-*

vJoi;i.er Has r ;.e a u t h o r i t y : *

properly exclude persons from attending the school.3

T. at 5 - 6 ,

11.
F i n a l l y , even i: the p r o p e r t y w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o b e "open to
the p u b l i c , " t h e i n v i t a t i o n as to the d e f e n d a n t h a d b e e n c l e a r l y
t h e -'i- i -:-.::;:.*;.

revoked

Fi ir ther

substantial

interference

with

• •;. - : i e i ice

ciii d

presei it

the owner's u s e of the property.

Defendant w a s told not to return ; •• the Art Center School d u e to
hi s prd or conduct :i n the cour se

"T at ] 2 1.3, 2 8

It is apparent

from the record that defendant's presence w a s disruptive and that

aware of the defense.
Reference to the Ordinance defendant w a s
cited u n d e r would obviously not have revealed the defense, and
further research (or experience) would be needed to adduce that the
defense w a s applicable. Trial counsel m a y have been aware of the
defense and chosen not to present it, which choice the City asserts
would b e reasonable, or tria] counsel m a y have been unaware of the
defense.
If unaware, the City does not concede that such
unawareness is unreasonable, b u t rather that there is n o prejudice
In not presenting the defense. S e e later discussion,
supra.
2

It i s clear under Utah law, the defense presented is not
restricted to public-owned property, but also applies to private
property open to the public. Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P. 2d 433
(Utah App. 1987).
3

Assuming the excxusi-.n is

for a non-arbitrary reason.

a

was why he was asked not to return.

B.

Even if Trial Counsel's representation fell below the
required objective standard of reasonableness, there is
no reasonable probability of a different result.

In order for Defendant

to succeed under an ineffective

assistance claim, not only must the representation be shown to fall
below the objective standard of reasonableness, but prejudice must
also be shown.

This means that defendant must show a reasonable

probability that the result would have been different, absent the
failure of counsel.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 688.

In Hay, the defendant was convicted of second
He

appealed

claiming

ineffective

assistance

specifically noting that counsel was deficient

degree murder.
of

counsel,

in failing to

discover the existence of a knife which defendant alleged was
brandished against him by the murder victim.

Defendant alleged

that the knife would have bolstered his claim of self-defense.
In addressing the claim, the Court went directly to the second
prong of the Strickland analysis and found that even if counsel's
performance were deficient, it was harmless in light of the other
testimony presented at trial.

Hay at 5.

Similarly, and as noted earlier, even if counsel failed to act
reasonably in not presenting the defense to the trial court, the
error is harmless because the defense is not applicable to the
facts at hand.
public.

The Art Center School is not a place open to the

Additionally, if it were, the defendant's invitation to
8

enter the A r t Center School had been clearly revoked
defendant' s p r e s e n c e there c:l :i d i i iterf er e witl i •'.•••

'^irally

the

• •-.•.- * r ,:.-. •-. :

the property.

II

DEFENDANT

CANNOT

CI AID I PLAIN' ER RC 'R FOR T H E FIRST TIME ON

A P P E A L BECAUSE T H E TRIAL COURT'S

FAILURE TO ENTER A N A C Q U I T T A L

B A S E D ON T H E STATUTORY DEFENSE TO TRESPASS W A S Nui v

— •^ .

An it... • i.di^e,; : or the fi rst time on appeal wi.i r;e iddressed
only if the r;ria] coui-. proceedings demonstrate plain error.
error will b e found uiu;. if: th^ appellate c o m t :.*.***

»

Plain
\\)

the error should have been obvious to a trial court; and (2) the
error must 1-e harmful

A.

Failure

. •• '

.'- affects the substantial rights of

to enter an acquittal

based

on the statutory

defense i s i lot err or that shoul d have b e e n obvious to the
trial court.
Prior discussion had shown that the statutory defense w a s not
applicable

I.«. i- \ \w-t defendant's

case,

Therefore,

n o error w a s

committed in failing to raise the defense, and there is n o p l a i n
error in thf trial court's failure to enter an acq i litt .a]
B.

Er;.i_ure to enter a n acquittal
defense

was

not

harmful

and

based
did

on the statutory
not

affect

the

substantial ri a! »• <=• ' •* * - h ^ - ^ f ei idant.
A s noted above, th«j sLatuLory defense w a s not a p p l i c a b l e to
the d e f e n d a n t ' s case, so the court's failure to enter a n acquittal
y

based on the defense was not harmful and did not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant.4
In summary, trial counsel's representation did not fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and defendant was not
prejudiced. Additionally, the failure of the trial court to enter
an acquittal was not plain error.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the City requests that the
appeal of the Defendant be denied, with the judgement of the trial
court affirmed.

Dated this 8th day of November, 1993.

4

The City concedes that if, in fact, the defense did apply
to the facts at hand, the second prong of the Brown test would
apply, but the City does not concede that such a situation would be
"plain error" such that the trial court should have known it was
committing error.
10
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CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-206

mission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor
1973
76-6-206. C r i m i n a l trespass.
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" m e a n s intrusion of the entire body
(2) A person is guilty of cnminal trespass if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined
in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and
(I) intends to cause annoyance or injury to
any person or damage to any property, including t h e use of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
(II) intends to commit a n y crime, other
t h a n theft or a felony, or
(III) is reckless as to whether his presence
will cause fear for the safety of another, or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful,
he enters or remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by
(I) personal communication to t h e actor by
the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner,
(II) fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders,
(III) posting of signs reasonably likely to
come to t h e attention of intruders
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is a n infraction
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section
that the
(a) property was open to the public when t h e
actor entered or remained, and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property
1992
PART 3
ROBBERY
76-6-301. R o b b e r y .
(1) Robbery is t h e unlawful and intentional t a k i n g
of personal property in the possession of another from
his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree
1973
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in t h e
course of committing robbery, he
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601, or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony
(3) For the purposes of this part, a n act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in a n attempt to commit, during t h e
commission of, or in the immediate flight after t h e
attempt or commission of a robbery
1989
PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For t h e purposes of this part*
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible per-

220

sonal prooenv, c a p t u r e or domestic animals and
birds *-n~Wn mstr-rnents or other writings
r e p r e s e n t s or err^ocying rights concerning
real or personal prop*-T}, labor, services, or otherwise aof-aining f i n i n g of value to the
owner con^nodities A a public utility nature
such as -jfc.ecomm-nations, gas, electricity,
steam, or -as-ater, and ^rade secrets, meaning the
whole or an-. Dortion ' - ^ny scientific or technical
information, design —cess, procedure, formula
or in\ention which :rj& owner thereof intends to
be a\aiiaoife only to a r s o n s selected by him
(2) "Obtain"'mean.* _n relation to property, to
bring about a transfer of possession or of some
other legal!v r e c o ^ - ^ interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another, m relation to
labor or services, to =-scire performance thereof,
and in relation to a -rade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, phov zraph, or other reproduces) ~Punx/se to decr:ve" means to have the
conscious object
(at To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances t h a : a substantial portion of
its economic valu*- or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost, or
<b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation, or
(a To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control"
m e a n s b u t is not nece-^anly limited to, conduct
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taKing, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person mten(a; Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false
and that the actor does not believe to be true
and that is hkley to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, or
ib) Fails to correct a false impression of
law or fact that the actor previously created
or confirmed by words or conduct that is
likely to affect the judgment of another and
that the actor does not now believe to be
true, or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the
transaction, or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a h e n , security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of t h e prop
erty, whether the lien, security interest
claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is
or is not a matter of official record, or
(e) Promises performance t h a t is likely to
affect the judgment of another in t h e t r a n s
action, which performance the actor does nol
intend to perform or knows will not be per
formed, provided, however, t h a t failure to
perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not suffi
cient proof that the actor did not intend to
perform or knew the promise would not be
197J
performed
""*

11.36.120

b. Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
impairment of any public utility service; or
2. He or she intentionally damages, defaces or
destroys the property of another;
3. He or she recklessly or wilfully shoots oi
propels a missile or other object at or against a
motor vehicle; horse or carriage, operating under
the provisions of Chapter 5.37 of this code, or its
successor; bus; airplane; boat; locomotive; train;
railway car or caboose; whether moving or stand
ing.
B. Violation of this section is a Class B misde
meanorif the actor's conduct causes or is intended
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of two hundred
fifty dollars, and is a Class C misdemeanor if the
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause loss
of less than two hundred fifty dollars. (Ord. 52-89
§ 4,1989; Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code
§32-3-5)
11*36.130

Trespass by persons and motor
vehicles.
A. It is unlawful for any person to take down
any fence, or to let down any bars, or to open any
gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive,
walk, lodge, or camp or sleep upon the premises
of another without the permission of the owner oi
occupant thereof, or to remain upon such premises after the permission of the owner or occupant
thereof has been revoked by such owner or occu
pant.
B It is unlawful for any person to drive or park
any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven
cycle upon any city-owned property not designated for vehicular traffic or parking without permission of the mayor of the city or his or her
designated appointee.
C. It is unlawful for any person to operate any
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies,
motorscooters or jeeps) upon the private property
of another, without first obtaining the written permission of the person in lawful possession of the

property or, if the propex i:> is unoccupied, the
owner of such property.
D It is unlawful for any person to operate any
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies,
motorscooters or jeeps) upon any public property,
except designated streets, highways or alleys, without first obtaining the written permission of the
public entity which is in possession of such property or, if the property is unoccupied, the public
entity which owns such property.
E. Every person who operates any type of
motor vehicle upon the private property of another or upon any public property, except as hereinabove provided, at all times while so operating
such motor vehicle shall maintain in his or her
possession the written permission required by the
two preceding subsections, except that, if the same
document grants permission to two or more persons, a person named in such document need not
have it in his or her possession while another
person named in the same document,ridingin the
same group and not more than three hundred feet
from such person, has such document in his or her
possession.
F. This section does not prohibit the use of
such property by the following:
1. Emergency vehicles;
2. Vehicles of commerce in the course of normal business operations;
3. Vehicles being operated on property devoted to commercial or industrial purposes where
such operation is in conjunction with commercial
or industrial use and permission for such operation is implied or expressly given by the person in
possession of said property;
4. Vehicles operated on property actually used
for residential purposes, where such vehicles are
there at the express or implied invitation of the
owner or occupant;
5 Vehicles being operated on public or private
parking lots, where permission to do so is implied
or expressly given by the person in possession of
such lot.
(Silt Like City & 90)

1136.130

G. Violation of this section shall be punishable
as follows:
1. Trespass in a dwelling shall constitute a
Class B misdemeanor violation.
2. Entering or remaining upon property, other
than a dwelling, where such trespass would cause
injury or property damage, shall be a Class C
misdemeanor.
3. Trespass, other than a dwelling, where no
damage or injury occurs, is an infraction. (Ord.
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 32-3-3)

Chapter 11.40
FRAUDS AND CHEATS

Sections:
11.40.020

11.36.140

Placing printed matter on
vehicles.
A. It is unlawful for any person to distribute,
deposit, place, throw, scatter or cast, or cause to
be distributed, deposited, placed, thrown, scattered or cast, any handbill, circular, card, booklet,
placard or other printed or written matter of any
type, except notice of parking violations together
with an envelope for the payment thereof, in or
upon any automobile or other vehicle.
B. The provisions of this section shall not be
deemed to prohibit the handing, transmitting or
distributing of any noncommercial printed or written matter to the owner or other occupant of any
automobile or other vehicle who is willing to accept the same. (Prior code § 32-3-9)

Obtaining money or goods
under false pretenses.

11.40.030

Cheats and swindlers.

11.40.040

Using slugs in vending
machines.

11.40.050

Slugs or counterfeit coins—
Manufacture or sale
prohibited.

11.40.060

Leaving establishment
without paying prohibited.

11.40.070

Selling or receiving articles
with serial numbers or marks
removed.

11.40.020

Obtaining money or goods
under false pretenses.
It is unlawful for any person, by false or fraudulent representation or pretense, to obtain from
another person any chose in action, money, goods,
wares, merchandise, chattels, effects or other
valuable thing, with intent to cheat or defraud any
person of the same, within the limits of the city;
provided, the value of the property so obtained
does not exceed one hundred dollars. (Prior code
§32-4-1)

1136.150

Expectoration and spitting in
public places.
It is unlawful for any person to expectorate or
spit, or throw cigar stumps, cigarette stumps or
quids of tobacco on the floor of any street railway
car or other public conveyance, or public building,
or upon any paved sidewalk or paved crosswalk
within the city. (Prior code § 32-3-7)

11.40.030
Cheats and swindlers.
It is unlawful for any person to engage in or
practice any game, trick or device with the intent
to obtain money or other valuable thing from
others by trick or fraud, or to aid or assist therein.
(Prior code §32-4-2)
11.40.040
Using slugs in vending machines.
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly place
any token, slug, false or counterfeit coin, or

(Salt Lake Gty 8-90)
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